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MORRIS PLOSCOwE
Few fields of the law are more in need of reform than divorce. The
reasons have been obvious for years. Lawyers are basically realists, who
prefer to apply legal principles to ascertainable and verifiable facts. A
modem lawyer has an abhorrence for the legal fictions and the pious
perjuries which were so dear to the heart of the medievalist. But there
is no area of the law in which fact and fiction, reality and myth, truth
and perjury, are so interwoven as in the operations of the present laws
of divorce. Moreover, lawyers as a class take the canons of legal ethics
seriously. They prefer to practice as honorable men. Yet no branch of
the law throws more of a strain upon a lawyer's conscience or tends as
much to befuddle the canons of ethics as the practice of divorce law.
The very premises on which divorce laws are based put a premium
on make believe, pretence and perjury, and convert matrimonial
litigation into a never-never land of unreality and fiction. Basic in
divorce law is the concept that the legislature can specify particular
grounds which, if present in a matrimonial relationship, make marital
life so intolerable that a dissolution of marriage through divorce is
necessary. This attitude of the law is derived from the procedure of
the ecclesiastical courts of England which permitted only two grounds,
physical cruelty and adultery, as a basis for a limited divorce from bed
and board, which permitted the parties to live separate and apart, but
did not give them the right to remarry. There are, unfortunately, many
different varieties of behavior besides physical cruelty and adultery
which may wreck a marriage. Divorce statutes have come to be known
as "strict" or "liberal" depending upon the number of grounds they
provide which would justify the dissolution of a marriage. However,
it is impossible to categorize all the varieties of matrimonial friction
and individual malevolence which would justify divorce in any single
divorce statute. It is obvious that under restrictive divorce statutes
listing few grounds for divorce, large areas of misbehavior are present
which may make marital life intolerable, but which do not legally
justify a divorce. This aspect of the law is epitomized in a recent New
York case in which a divorce action was brought by the wife because
of the sodomy of the husband which had resulted in his being sentenced
to state prison for a long term. The New York statute provides only
one ground for divorce, namely adultery. As a technical matter, sodomy
is not adultery. The wife was denied a divorce in this case as a matter
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of law.' Yet it is apparent that homosexuality and sodomy on the part
of a husband can wreck a marriage far more -effectively than an oc-
casional escapade with another woman.
Where the husband and wife desire their matrimonial freedom,
and the particular misbehavior which has marred their marriage is
not listed in the statute as one of the grounds for divorce, then the
pressure to manufacture the legal grounds becomes well nigh irre-
sistible. Perjury is a small price to pay for matrimonial freedom. Here
is the basic reason for the staged bedroom dramas which are such a
characteristic feature of New York divorce litigation. This is illustrated
by Justice Bonynge's remark in Reed v. Littleton,2 "Has not my good
brother overlooked the fact that a certain amount of naivete is an
essential adjunct to the judicial office? Does not the Supreme court
grind out thousands of divorces annually upon the stereotyped sin of
the same big blonde attired in the same black silk pajamas? Is not
access to the chamber of love quite uniformly obtained by announcing
that it is a maid bringing towels or a messenger boy with an urgent
telegram?"
The pressure to find a means of dissolving marriages which are not
listed in the statute is responsible for the tremendous growth of annul-
ments as a substitute for divorce in New York, which has caused New
York to be designated as a "poor man's Reno." Annulment is a tra-
ditional technique for dissolving marriage because of defects or im-
pediments occurring at the inception of the marriage contract. In New
York there can be little doubt that many of the defects or impediments
on which annulment actions are based are conjured up for the occasion
as a device to secure matrimonial freedom. They are normally dis-
covered after a husband and wife find they are incompatible and go to
a lawyer to ascertain how they may dissolve the chains that bind them.
Referee Lapham's comments in Richardson v. Richardson3 indicate the
extent to which perjury is resorted to in annulment proceedings in
order to achieve the goal of marital freedom:
An analysis of the unending procession of annullment
actions on the calendars of our courts, gives rise to the con-
viction that many persons who would not stoop to frame a
false charge of adultery fall prey to the temptation of mag-
nifying pre-marital assurances and post-marital words and
acts, to satisfy the technical requirements of the law, thus
shielding themselves from the necessity of disclosing the real
cause of the rift .... It is the task of sifting the sincere and
truthful from the sham and fabricated, that taxes the analyti-
cal powers of the Court.4
1 Cohen v. Cohen, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 426 (1951).
2 159 Misc. 853, 289 N.Y.S. 798 (1936).
8 103 N.Y.S. 2d 219 (1951).
4 Id. at 222.
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Other aspects of our divorce laws are also completely out of touch
with the realities of modem divorce litigation. There is the doctrine
of recrimination in divorce law, which would permit a divorce to be
granted only to an innocent and injured party. Interpreted literally,
this would mean a denial of divorce in most cases since normally both
parties contribute to matrimonial conflict and discord. This require-
ment of divorce law is ignored in actual practice, since most divorce
cases are uncontested, and there is no defendant available to tell a
court about domestic woes he has suffered at the hands of the plaintiff.
Similarly, there is a rigorous prohibition of collusion and connivance
in divorce law. Divorces cannot be had because both parties want them
and cooperate in obtaining them. But in modem divorce litigation,
when a husband and wife have decided to go their separate ways and
have settled their conflicts over property, alimony, custody of children,
etc., a divorce proceeding is brought with the consent of loth parties.
The collusive divorce is the rule rather than the exception. This was
noted by a writer who stated:
Legal prohibitions and judicial declarations to the con-
trary ... a divorce may in reality be expeditiously obtained
simply if both spouces mutually agree to do so and if they are
willing to pay the toll .... No satisfactory method of eliminat-
ing collusion [in divorce cases] has been devised. But there is
a "persistent belief as to the prevalence of the practice with
legislators, judges, official referees, court clerks, lawyers, liti-
gants and writers, all swelling the flood of opinion with their
testimony." Although England and the United States have
not adopted the principle of mutual consent divorces, such
divorces "are through collusion a fact in the United States
and England."5
The above does not exhaust the catalogue of pretence and make
believe which is part and parcel of the administration of our divorce
laws. Other facets may be noted. There is the daily spectacle of courts
announcing on the one hand that the State has a vital interest in the
maintenance and stability of the marital relationship and on the other
dissolving marriages upon the basis of trivial incidents of what is
euphemistically called mental cruelty. There is the phenomenon of
judges in the so-called "quickie" divorce jurisdictions solemnly declar-
ing that domicile, evidenced by the intention to establish a permanent
home in the State, is a prerequisite to jurisdiction in any divorce pro-
ceeding. Nevertheless that does not prevent them from permitting their
courts to be used as an adjunct of the tourist traffic. More than one
writer has obtained the best information about the divorce law of these
states, not from the bar associations, but from the Chambers of Corn-
5 36 COL. L. REv. 1121, 1127 (1936).
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merce.6 The result is that while lip service is paid to domicile as the
basis of divorce jurisdiction, decrees are handed down in favor of
plaintiffs who have come into the state solely for the purpose of pro-
curing a divorce, and expect to leave as soon as it is granted.
Any well informed lawyer is familiar with the facts above
mentioned. But while writers, judges and observers deplore such con-
ditions in our divorce courts, efforts to bring about material changes
have largely resulted in failure.
This failure becomes apparent when the history of divorce law
reform in this country is studied. As early as 1879, the American Bar
Association instructed its Committee on Jurisprudence and Law
Reform to recommend such changes as they deemed expedient for
bringing about more uniformity in the laws of marriage and divorce
among the several states. This hope for uniform laws was echoed again
by President Theodore Roosevelt a quarter of a century later in his
message to Congress in 1905.
There is a widespread conviction that the divorce laws are
dangerously lax and indifferently administered in some of the
states, resulting in a diminishing regard for the sanctity of
the marriage relation.
The hope is entertained that co-operation amongst the
several states can be secured to the end that there may be
enacted on the subject of marriage and divorce, uniform
laws containing all possible safeguards for the security of the
family.
This expression of hope by President Roosevelt took concrete
form when the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute authorizing
its governor to call a national divorce congress to consider what steps
could be taken to abate the evil of increasing divorces in the United
States. This Congress was called at the instance of Governor Penny-
packer of Pennsylvania and met in Washington in 1906. All states
sent delegates to this Congress except Mississippi, Nevada and South
Carolina. The draft of a statute regulating divorce, arising out of the
deliberations of this Congress, was a moderate and restrained docu-
ment. It provided for both absolute and limited divorces. It insisted
upon bona fide residence or domicile as a prerequisite for divorce. It
specified the causes for anulment as well as divorce. The draft act
provided only six grounds for absolute divorce, namely, adultery,
bigamy, extreme cruelty, conviction of crime in certain cases, wilful
desertion for two years, and habitual drunkenness for a period of
two years. No divorce could be granted except upon affirmative proof
aside from any admissions on the part of the respondent, and fraud or
collusion in obtaining a divorce were severely condemned.
6 See notably, 17 MINN. L. REv. 638 (1932-3); Pollitt, Quick Divorce, 39 KY.
L J. 288, 293 (1950.51).
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The draft statute of the divorce congress was recommended to the
various States by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. How-
ever, only New Jersey, Delaware, and Wisconsin adopted the principles
of the draft act. Parts of the proposed Statute were adopted in other
states, but the effort to make this statute the basic act on divorce
throughout the country and thus to unify the divorce laws, resulted in
failure. It was not even adopted in Pennsylvania, whose legislature
was instrumental in calling the Congress.
The divorce congress, although it was optimistic about the pos-
sibility of unifying divorce laws through action of state legislatures,
was extremely skeptical as to the possibility of achieving divorce reform
through Federal legislation. Accordingly, it passed a resolution stating
that it was the intent of the Congress that no Federal divorce law was
feasible, and that all efforts to secure the passage of a Constitutional
amendment, a necessary prerequisite, would be futile. Despite this
skepticism, many resolutions were introduced into Congress pro-
viding for an amendment to the Constitution which would give Con-
gress power "to make laws which shall be uniform throughout the
United States on marriage and divorce."7 Senator Capper in particular
sought earnestly to get Congress to pass this and similar resolutions,
because he felt that it was the best way to lift the standards of our
marriage laws as well as to correct the looseness and laxity in divorce
administration, particularly in the migratory divorce jurisdictions.8
The various resolutions to amend the Federal constitution, however,
never even came to a vote in Congress. Thus any attempt to eliminate
the present evils of divorce through a transfer of jurisdiction over
marriage and divorce from the States to the Federal Government has
been completely stymied.
One of the basic reasons for a Federal statute on divorce is the
necessity of eliminating the evils which result from migratory divorces
obtained in jurisdictions where neither the plaintiff nor the de-
fendant reside or are domiciled. These evils were succinctly summarized
by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent in Estin v. Estin,9 "If there is one
thing that the people are entitled to expect from lawmakers, it is rules
of law, that will enable individuals to tell whether they are married
and if so to whom. Today many people who have simply lived in more
than one state do not know, and the most learned lawyer cannot advise
them with any confidence. The uncertainties that result are not merely
technical, nor are they trivial; they effect fundamental rights and
relationships such as the lawfulness of their cohabitation, their chil-
dren's legitimacy, their title to property, and even whether they are
7 See for example S. J. Res. 5, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
8 See for example Hearings before Senate Sub-Committee on Judiciary on S.J.
Res. 5, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
9 334 US. 541, 553 (1948).
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law abiding persons or criminals. In a society as mobile as ours, such
uncertainties affect a large number of people and create a social
problem of some magnitude."
These evils are particularly apparent in States like New York
with technically strict divorce laws, whose citizens take their domestic
woes in large numbers to "quickie" divorce jurisdictions. But the
extent of the evils resulting from migratory divorce has not, over the
years, moved Congress to take favorable action on the Constitutional
Amendment which would pave the way for the exercise by the Federal
courts of power over divorce.
Since a federal divorce law is not an immediate possibility, the
attempt has been made to meet the evils of migratory divorce on a
state level. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has drafted and recommended for adoption by the States
a uniform divorce recognition act, prescribing principles which would
entitle out-of-state divorces to recognition in the home state. However,
this statute has been adopted in only seven states.
Individual states have from time to time amended their divorce
statues so as to make them more realistic instruments for dealing with
the incidents of matrimonial strife. South Carolina, for example,
which for many years was the only state not permitting absolute divorce
on any grounds, has recently struck from its Constitution the pro-
hibition against such divorces. Its Constitution now provides for ab-
solute divorce on the grounds of adultery, desertion, physical cruelty
and habitual drunkenness. 10 A number of states such as Arkansas,
Louisiana and North Carolina, have made it possible to terminate
marriages through divorce by the simple act of the parties living
separate and apart for the number of years specified. New Mexico has
accepted the fact that the inability of the two parties to get along and
make their marriage work is the basic reason for the application for
divorce. This State has accordingly amended its statutes and made
temperamental incompatibility a ground for divorce."
But the path of divorce reformers through state legislatures is
a very uneven one. Perhaps the most striking failure of divorce reform
is in New York, where a bill proposed by the Bar Association of the
City of New York, which would have added five new grounds for
absolute divorce (besides adultery which is presently the sole ground)
was introduced at a number of sessions of the State Legislature and
never even got out of Committee. The Divorce Reform Committee of
the Association of the Bar has been reduced to advocating a bill which
would provide for a Commission to study the administration of divorce
10 Act No. 95 of Acts and Joint Resolutions, 1949.
11 Sec. 25-701, N.M.S. 1941 anno.; see also Poteet v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214, 114
P. 2d 91 (1941).
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laws in New York. Such a study could only bring to light the familiar
evils already apparent to everybody.
There are a number of basic reasons for the failure of divorce
reform to make better progress in this country. In the first place, the
divorce reformer must attempt to steer between two completely ir-
reconcilable positions. There are those who believe that the family
unit is already irretrievably broken when an application for divorce
is made to a public authority. Where a divorce decree is sought by
both parties to a marriage, these persons believe that it should be
granted without reference to traditional rules as to grounds for
divorce, who was at fault in the disruption of the marriage, collusion,
recrimination, etc. These individuals urge in effect that the law adopt
the Roman law view of divorce by consent of the parties. On the other
hand, there are many who like the Catholics and some Episcopalians
believe that the whole concept of dissolving a valid marriage through
divorce is evil, and that the only reform possible in our divorce laws is
to abolish divorce altogether, permitting only a limited separation
from bed and board in appropriate cases.
The divorce reformer, in attempting to formulate uniform divorce
laws for the country, has tried to steer a middle course between these
extremes and provide a traditional statute with grounds for divorce,
which are approved in a majority of the States. This approach has not
satisfied those who feel that some adaptation of the Roman law of
divorce, is the way to deal with our divorce problems. Nor has it
satisfied persons in States with liberal divorce laws, which provide for
numerous grounds for divorce. It is futile, for example ,to expect that
the authorities in the migratory divorce jurisdictions will give up their
peculiar approach to divorce in the interests of national uniformity.
Divorce in these states is a major source of revenue which Will not be
surrendered except under the compulsion of Federal law. There is no
sign of such cumpulsion. Indeed, the Supreme Court, which might
serve as an instrument to break up the migratory divorce racket, has in
effect largely given the racket its blessing in the Sherer and Coe cases12
and in its overruling of Haddock v. Haddock.13
The proposal to extend the grounds for divorce in states with
relatively strict divorce laws has run into the unremitting opposition
of those who believe that no earthly power can dissolve a marriage
which has once been validly entered into. That there is absolutely no
room for compromise on this question of making divorce easier is
apparent from the comments of a Catholic lawyer, writing in the
Loyola Law Review: 14
12 34 U.S. 343 (1947).
1 201 U.S. 562 (1906), overruled in, Williams v. North Carolina, 517 Us.
287 (1942).
14 5 LoYoLA L. REV. 159, 160, 161 (1949-50).
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Legislation legalizing divorce is malum in se, and when
the civil courts pronounce a decree of divorce not only do
they act illicitly, their decree effectuates no real dissolution
of the marriage bond.... It is obvious that the divorce laws
of our modern states are evil in themselves and similarly the
application of these laws through the courts is also evil ...
since they cannot really accomplish what the law attempts,
namely dissolve the bond in reality.
There are large numbers of persons in every state who have the
same religious convictions about divorce as this writer. Obviously
such individuals will unalterably oppose any attempt to deal with the
scandals arising from divorce law administration by making divorce
easier.
The second major factor in the failure of divorce reform is the
fact that the traditional approach to divorce is bankrupt and no
divorce statute drawn on traditional lines can be satisfactory. The
traditional approach to divorce fails to come to grips with the real
issues involved in the breakup of marriages. Legal fault which
justifies a divorce, no matter how that fault is phrased in a statute be-
comes merely a convention, a legal formula which must be fulfilled
before marital freedom is obtained. The means whereby the evidence
is obtained depends upon the squeamishness of the parties and their
attorneys. It may have little relevance to the respective faults of the
husband and wife or to the basic reasons for wanting a divorce. No-
where in the traditional approach is there room for the question of
what actually brought the husband and wife to their present bad
position. How does it happen that a marriage begun with such high
hopes has ended in disillusion and failure? What qualities of person-
ality, what social and economic factors contributed to the breakdown
of the family unit? Is it possible to solve the difficulties existing between
the husband and wife by means short of divorce? The traditional ap-
proach to divorce cannot provide answers to such questions. Although
it is theoretically based on an adversary proceeding, in nine out of ten
cases only one party to the marriage appears. Even if both parties were
to appear, the divorce courts simply do not have the machinery nor the
facilities to produce the objective independent data on what is really
troubling a husband and wife, and what is really causing the disrup-
tion of the marriage. Our divorce courts and our divorce proceedings
have in large measure ignored the many disciplines such as family case
work, psychiatry, marriage counselling and probation that have been
dealing with problems of family disorganization and marital conflict
for years. 15
Only in recent years has the ineptitude of the traditional approach
to divorce been realized. Under the inspiring leadership of Judge Paul
15 See PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 58.
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Alexander, chairman of the American Bar Association Committee on
Divorce and Marriage Laws, a start has been made in the direction of
modifying the law so that it will provide a diagnostic and therapeutic
approach to divorce which is absolutely necessary if divorce courts are
to serve the fundamental interest of the law in the conservation of
family life. As Judge Alexander puts it:
The American Bar Association Committee proposes to
transform the divorce court from a morgue into a hospital, to
handle our ailing marriages and delinquent spouses much as
we handle delinquent chldren .... Instead of looking only at
the guilt of the defendant, it proposes to examine the whole
marriage, endeavor to discover the basic causative factors,
seek to rectify them, enlisting the aid of other sciences and
disciplines and of all available community resources.16
A statute embodying the therapeutic and diagnostic approach to
divorce suggested by Judge Alexander remains to be drawn. When
formulated, it is to be hoped that it will be easier to enact than statutes
based on a traditional approach to divorce. A therapeutic and diagnos-
tic statute would unquestionably serve much better the law's interest
in the maintenance and stability of the family.
Finally divorce reform has failed because it has been concerned
far too much with the techniques of dissolving marriages and not suf-
ficiently with the methods of entering the marriage relationship. Lax
marriage laws are one of the major sources of marital discord and
marital disruption. So long as it is possible for men and women and
boys and girls to run off and get married on the spur of the moment
without reflection or deliberation, with a minimum of formalities or
no formalities at all beyond production of a license fee, there will in-
evitably be great pressure upon the divorce laws to dissolve the hasty
marriages when the parties discover they are seriously mismated. This
is apparent from a recent study of divorce in Hamilton County,
Tennessee. The large number of divorces in this county, states the
report, "is probably attributable to a large extent to the ease with which
marriages are contracted over the state line in Georgia, particular-
ly in Rossville.... Because of the utter lack of restrictions in procuring
licenses ... in Georgia the Justice of the Peace was enabled to issue the
licenses and likewise to perform the ceremony. The only requirements
for marriage in Georgia were for the couple to want to marry, a trip to
a justice of the peace and a fee of five dollars. A great many of the
marriages so performed resulted in divorces filed in Hamilton
County."17
Judge Alexander has stated that of the 12,000 divorce cases coming
before him, one out of three followed what he called a migratory
16 1950 A.BA.J. 169-170. See'also 19 Km. B. J. 322 (1950-1951).
17 19 TFNN. L. REv. 932-3 (1947).
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marriage performed in a place where neither party lived and where
license formalities are lax.18
The elimination of child marriages, the insistence upon parental
consent in the case of the marriage of minors, the prevention of the
marriage of the mentally deficient, the mentally unfit and the physical-
ly diseased, the elimination of hasty and clandestine marriages through
the provision of adequate waiting periods between marriage license
applications and marriage ceremonies, the insistence upon residence
of one of the parties as a requirement for the issuance of the marriage
license; these are some of the changes in the marriage laws of the various
states which would materially cut down the extent to which men and
women resort to divorce courts. Lax marriage laws and procedures are
one of the principal factors in the demand for the dissolution of
marriage through divorce. A divorce reformer who has sincerely at
heart the interest of the state in the conservation of marriage, must
therefore concern himself with improving techniques and methods of
entering the marriage relationship, as well as the techniques and
methods whereby it is dissolved.
IS See 19 KAN. B. J. 329 (1950-51).
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